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Abstract. There are several problems associated with the current ways that 
certificates are published and revoked. This paper discusses these problems, and 
then proposes a solution based on the use of WebDAV, an enhancement to the 
HTTP protocol. The proposed solution provides instant certificate revocation, 
minimizes the processing costs of the certificate issuer and relying party, and 
eases the administrative burden of publishing certificates and certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs). 
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1   Introduction 
The most common and standardized way of publishing X.509 certificates is in 
corporate LDAP servers. Several technical problems with the use of LDAP directory 
servers have been widely documented [1], including: the use ;binary encodings, the 
lack of a distributed directory capability, and the inability to search for certificates 
containing specific fields. Other problems are less technical in nature and instead are 
operational, but they are nevertheless just as inhibiting to successful deployments. For 
example, most corporate firewalls do not allow the LDAP protocol to pass through 
them, therefore certificates or certificate revocation lists (CRLs) cannot be easily 
accessed by external organizations. Finally, we have the complexity of installing and 
managing LDAP servers, for example, loading the correct schema and setting the 
correct access rights, which although not insoluble, nevertheless cause frustration and 
inconvenience especially to small scale deployments with a lack of specialist staff. 
For these reasons we wanted to find an alternative mechanism to LDAP for 
publishing X.509 certificates and CRLs that would not suffer from these problems. 
We wanted a generic solution that would support both public key certificates (PKCs) 
and attribute certificates (ACs), and that most (ideally all) organizations would 
already be familiar with. We chose to use Apache servers and the HTTP protocol, 
since these are ubiquitous. But HTTP on its own is insufficient, since it does not 
provide a number of useful features, such as the ability to search for specific content. 
For this reason we investigated (and subsequently implemented) the WebDAV 
extensions to HTTP [2]. 
The most common way of revoking public key certificates is through the use of 
CRLs. However these suffer from a number of well documented operational problems 
such as the potential for denial of service attacks from lack of availability, or the 
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consumption of too many resources due to their increasingly large size. We will 
address the whole issue of certificate revocation in the next section, and describe why 
we have adopted an alternative approach for revocation based on WebDAV. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 re-appraisers the whole 
issue of certificate revocation and proposes a different approach to addressing this 
issue. Section 3 describes the WebDAV extensions to HTTP and how they can be 
used for X.509 certificate and CRL storage and retrieval. Section 4 describes our 
implementation of WebDAV in our PERMIS authorization infrastructure, in order to 
store X.509 attribute certificates used for authorization. This mechanism can similarly 
be used by PKIs to store public key certificates and CRLs. Section 5 discusses our 
approach, compares it to other work, and concludes. 
2   Reappraising Revocation 
There are several different approaches that have been taken to the complex issue of 
revocation of certificates, and of informing remote relying parties when revocation 
has taken place. A relying party is any Internet based service that consumes the issued 
certificate (whether it be a PKC or an AC). The primary objective of revocation is to 
remove a certificate (and all its copies, if any) from circulation as quickly as possible, 
so that relying parties are no longer able to use it. If this is not possible, a secondary 
objective is to inform the relying parties that an existing certificate in circulation has 
been revoked and should not be used or trusted. The latter can be achieved by 
requiring either the relying parties to periodically check with the certificate issuer, or 
the certificate issuer to periodically notify the relying parties. Of these, requiring the 
relying parties to periodically check with the certificate issuer is preferable for two 
reasons. Firstly, it places the onus on the relying parties rather than on the issuer, 
since it is the relying parties who are taking the risk of using revoked certificates. 
Secondly, an issuer may not know who all the relying parties are, so will have 
difficulty contacting them all, but the relying parties will always know who the 
certificate issuer is. 
The simplest approach to certificate revocation, that used by X.509 proxy public 
key certificates [6], the Virtual Organisation Membership Service’s (VOMS) X.509 
attribute certificates [8] and SAML attribute assertions [7] (which are to a first 
approximation simply XML encoding of attribute certificates), is to never revoke a 
certificate, and instead to issue short lived certificates that will expire after a short 
period of time. The certificates are thus effectively and automatically removed from 
circulation after this fixed period expires. The assumption is that it is unlikely that the 
certificates will ever need to be revoked immediately after they have been issued and 
before they have expired due to abuse, therefore the risk to the relying parties is small. 
Risk (or more precisely risk exposure) is the probability of occurrence multiplied by 
the loss if the event occurs. Because short lived certificates are only valid for a short 
period of time, the probability of occurrence is small. Of course, the loss or amount of 
damage that can be done in a short period of time can be huge, so short lived 
certificates are not always the best solution where the resulting loss can be high. 
Consequently SAML attribute assertions have the optional feature of containing a 
“one time use” field which means that the consuming service can only use the 
attribute assertion once to grant access, and then it should never be used again. This is 
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designed to minimise the loss. A similar standardised extension could easily be 
defined for short lived X.509 public key and attribute certificates, in order to flag 
them for one time use. But this is not a ubiquitous solution since short lived 
certificates are not appropriate for every situation, nor is one time use. 
An advantage of short lived certificates is that they effectively remove a certificate 
from circulation after a short period of time, and consequently they mandate that users 
or service providers must frequently contact the certificate issuer in order to obtain 
new freshly minted certificates. 
The main disadvantage of short lived certificates is knowing how long to issue 
them for. They should be valid for the maximum time that any user is likely to need 
them for, otherwise one of the later actions that a user performs may fail to be 
authenticated or authorised which could lead to a session being aborted and all the 
processing that has been done so far, being lost. This is a current well known problem 
with the use of X.509 proxy certificates in grid computing. On the other hand, the 
longer the certificates are valid, the greater their possibility of misuse without any 
direct way of withdrawing them from circulation. This has caused some researchers to 
suggest that proxy certificates should be revocable! 
A second disadvantage of short lived certificates is that the bulk of the effort is 
placed on the issuer, who has to keep reissuing new short lived certificates. This could 
become a bottleneck to performance. A better solution should put the bulk of the 
processing effort onto the relying parties, since these are the ones who want to use the 
issued certificates and the ones who need to minimise their risks. Thus it seems 
appropriate that they should be burdened with more of the costs. 
If the primary objective of removing a certificate from circulation cannot be easily 
achieved, then the secondary objective of notifying the relying parties when a 
certificate has been revoked can be achieved by issuing CRLs. A CRL is a digitally 
signed list of revoked certificates, usually signed by the same authority that issued the 
original certificates. Revocation lists are updated and issued periodically. X.509 CRLs 
contain their date and time of issue, and have an optional next update time which 
signifies the latest date by which the next CRL will be issued. Relying parties are 
urged to obtain the next issue of the revocation list from the issuer’s repository before 
the next update time has expired, in order to keep as up to date as possible. If the next 
update time is not specified in the CRL, then the frequency of update has to be 
communicated by out of band means from the issuer to the relying parties. 
Alternatively, the latest CRL can be sent by the subject along with his certificate, to 
prove that his certificates has not been revoked. The use of CRLs is standardised in 
X.509 [4] and the use of LDAP for storing CRLs in RFC 2252 [9]. Revocation lists 
ensure that relying parties are eventually informed when a certificate has been 
revoked, no matter how many copies of the certificate there are in circulation, but 
revocation lists have several big disadvantages. Firstly there is always some delay 
between a user’s certificate being revoked and the next issue of the revocation list 
appearing. This could be 24 hours or even longer, depending upon the frequency of 
issuance of the CRLs. Thus, in order to reduce risk to a minimum, a relying party 
would always need to delay authorising a user’s request until it had obtained the latest 
CRL that was published after the user issued his service request, which of course is 
impractical for most scenarios. If the relying party relies on the current revocation list, 
then the risk from using a revoked certificate equates, on average, to half that of using 
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a short lived certificate, assuming the validity period of a short lived certificate is 
equal to the period between successively issued CRLs. This reduced risk comes at an 
increased processing cost for the relying party and the issuer. 
CRLs can put a significant processing load on both the issuer and the relying party. 
CRLs have to be issued at least once ever time period, regardless of whether any 
certificates have been revoked or not during that period. In a large system the lists can 
get inordinately long containing many thousands of revoked certificates. These have 
to be re-issued every time period, distributed over the network and read in and 
processed by the relying parties. In Johnson and Johnson’s PKI, their CRL was over 
1MB large within a year of operation [10]. To alleviate this problem, the X.509 
standard defines delta revocation lists, which publish only the changes between the 
last published list and the current one. But this increases the processing complexity of 
the client, and few systems appear to support this feature today. 
An alternative approach to notifying relying parties is to use the online certificate 
status protocol (OCSP) [3]. Rather than a relying party periodically retrieving the 
latest revocation list from the issuer’s repository, the OCSP allows a relying party to 
ask an OCSP responder in real time if a certificate is still valid or not. The response 
indicates if the certificate is good, or has been revoked, or its status is unknown. Since 
most OCSP responders base their service on the latest published CRLs, the revocation 
status information is no more current than if the relying party had consulted the latest 
revocation list itself, thus the risk to the relying party is not lessened. But what an 
OCSP responder does do is reduce the amount of processing that a relying party has 
to undertake in order to validate a user’s certificate. This reduced cost to the relying 
parties is offset by the cost of setting up and running the OCSP service. 
We can see that none of the above approaches to revocation is ideal. Certificates 
often have a naturally long validity period. For example, authentication certificates 
are typically issued and renewed annually, whilst some authorisation certificates 
might require an equally long duration e.g. project manager of a 2 year project. Long 
lived certificates have traditionally necessitated the use of CRLs but they have several 
disadvantages. Alternatively we could issue short lived session certificates throughout 
the duration of the natural validity period, for both authentication and authorisation 
purposes, without needing to issue CRLs as well, but then there is the inherent 
conflict between making the short lived certificates long enough for the biggest 
session and short enough to minimise the risk. Thus we propose a new conceptual 
model that we believe is superior to short lived certificates, CRLs and OCSP servers.  
2.1   A New Model for Revocation 
We believe that the optimum approach to certificate issuing and revocation should 
have the following features:  
- A user’s certificate should only need to be issued once (and not continually 
reissued as with short lived certificates) in order to minimise the effort of the 
issuer.  
- The certificate should be valid for as long as the use case requires, which can 
be a long (measured in years) or short (measured in minutes) duration. Again, 
this minimises the effort of the certificate issuer (and the delegator, when 
attribute certificates are used to delegate authority).  
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- A certificate should be able to be used many times by many different relying 
parties, according to the user’s wishes, without having to be reissued. Of 
course, the certificate will need to be validated by each relying party each time 
it is used. But this mirrors the situation today with our plastic credit cards and 
other similar types of certificate.  
- A certificate should be capable of being revoked at any time, and the 
revocation should be instantaneous. Relying parties should be able to 
immediately learn about revocations thereby minimising their risks. 
All the above features, including instant revocation, can be achieved in the 
following way. The issuer issues a certificate, giving it its natural validity period, and 
stores the certificate in a HTTP based repository which is under the control of the 
issuer. We choose HTTP since this protocol can penetrate firewalls and provide read 
access to external relying parties. Each certificate is given its own unique URL (called 
the certificate URL) which points to its location in the repository. This URL is stored 
in the certificate in a standard extension, in order to strongly bind the repository 
location to the certificate, so that relying parties know where to go to check if the 
certificate is still valid. In order to revoke a certificate, the issuer simply deletes the 
certificate from its repository. The absence of a certificate at its published URL 
indicates that it is no longer valid. As an added security measure, the issuer may also 
simultaneously issue a CRL of length 1 and store this at another unique URL (called 
the revocation URL). The revocation URL, if used, should also be inserted into the 
original certificate using the existing standard CRL distribution points extension. 
Relying parties are now able to instantaneously find out the current status of a 
certificate by contacting the issuer’s repository, using either of the URLs embedded in 
the certificate. 
The frequency and method by which a relying party contacts the issuer’s repository 
is determined by its risk mitigation strategy and the optional presence of the 
revocation URL. The frequency can vary per application or per user request, and is set 
by the relying party as appropriate, and not by the issuer, which is putting the 
responsibility and risk where it belongs, with the relying party. In order to minimise 
risk, a relying party should contact the issuer’s repository when a certificate is first 
validated, and then periodically during the life of the user’s session according to its 
own risk assessment. If the relying party is operating in certificate pull mode, then it 
must contact the repository anyway at first use in order to pull the certificate, but if 
the relying party is operating in certificate push mode, contacting the repository is 
optional from a technical perspective. It must therefore be determined from a risk 
perspective.  
We propose the following procedure for determining the revocation status of a 
certificate. The relying party periodically issues a HTTP or HTTPS GET command to 
the certificate URL. (As previously stated, this should be when the certificate is first 
validated, and then at risk determined intervals.) We will discuss the choice between 
HTTP and HTTPS later. If the HTTP status code 404 Not Found is returned, the 
relying party may assume that the certificate has been revoked, and permanently 
record this in its internal cache along with the time of the request. If the certificate is 
returned, a simple bitwise comparison of the initial validated certificate with the 
subsequently retrieved copy of the certificate is all that is needed by the relying party 
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Fig. 1. The revocation procedure 
to ensure that the certificate is still identical to the one originally validated. Certificate 
signature verification is therefore not needed for revocation status checking. The 
relying party may optionally cache the valid certificate and its time of last retrieval. If 
the certificate has been updated in the repository during the user’s session, then the 
retrieved certificate will fail the bitwise comparison and will need to be validated 
again, but this should be a relatively rare occurrence. This procedure is designed to 
minimise the processing effort of the issuers and the relying parties, whilst 
maximising the freshness of the revocation information. Issuers do not need to 
continually mint new certificates or CRLs, and relying parties do not need to process 
potentially large revocation lists or perform expensive cryptographic operations for 
the vast majority of their revocation checks. 
If on the rare occasion a client is unable to contact the certificate URL and retrieve 
either a certificate or a Not Found response, it may attempt to contact the revocation 
URL, providing there is one is in the certificate. If the HTTP status code 404 Not 
Found is returned from the revocation URL, the relying party may assume that the 
certificate is still valid (except in high risk cases, where an attacker may be blocking 
access to the certificate URL and spoofing the revocation URL), and optionally cache 
this result along with the time of the request. If the CRL is returned instead of Not 
Found, the signature is validated and the relying party caches the result permanently 
to ensure the certificate cannot be used again and no further retrieves need be made.  
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Intermediate caching of the CRL is supported and encouraged, so that if a certificate 
has been revoked and the CRL successfully retrieved, intermediate web servers can 
cache the CRL to speed up subsequent queries. Finally, if the relying party is unable 
to make a connection to the revocation URL, or one does not exist, then the relying 
party can check its cache to see if a previous request to either URL has succeeded or 
not. If neither URLs are available, the relying party should use its local risk 
assessment procedure to decide what to do when there are network problems. For 
example, if the transaction is low risk, it may decide to treat the certificate as valid. 
Alternatively it may decide to try contacting the URLs again, or alternatively to treat 
the certificate as revoked. The flow chart in figure 1 summarises this procedure. 
Clients may use either HTTPS or HTTP depending upon their and the issuer’s 
security requirements. HTTP presents a number of security weaknesses compared to 
HTTPS. Firstly HTTP provides public access to the certificate, which may violate the 
privacy of the certificate subject. (There is no equivalent privacy leakage for a CRL.) 
Furthermore intermediate Web servers may cache copies of frequently accessed web 
pages to improve performance, but this would negate the proposed revocation service. 
To counteract this, the issuer’s Web server must use the no-cache cache-response-
directive [15] in the HTTP response of successful certificate requests and Not Found 
CRL requests, to prevent intermediate servers from caching these responses. This will 
ensure that all subsequent queries are directed to the authoritative source of the 
information and that stale cached responses are not received. Finally HTTP is 
susceptible to redirection, substitution and man in the middle attacks. Consequently, if 
the certificates are not meant to be publicly available or stronger security is required, 
then secure access should be provided using HTTP with TLS [5]. This will stop 
network redirection, substitution attacks and intermediate caching. TLS can also 
provide confidentiality of the retrieved certificates during transfer, in cases where 
privacy protection of sensitive certificates is required by the issuer. TLS can also 
provide strong client side authentication, which will allow access controls to be 
placed on the WebDAV repository, further protecting the privacy of the subjects’ 
certificates. The privacy of CRLs is less important, and it enhances security if more 
copies of these are publicly available. 
3   The WebDAV Protocol and Its Use with X.509 
WebDAV [2] is an Internet RFC that specifies extensions to the HTTP/1.1 protocol so 
that web content can be managed remotely. WebDAV provides users with the ability 
to create, remove and query information about web pages, including their contents 
and properties, such as their creation dates, expiry dates, authors etc. In the context of 
X.509, a web page will be a single X.509 certificate (either public key or attribute) or 
a CRL containing a single entry, and their properties can be any fields of the 
certificate or CRL.  WebDAV also provides the ability to create sets of related web 
pages, called collections, and to retrieve hierarchical membership listings of them. In 
the context of X.509, a certificate subject can represent a collection, and his/her  
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certificates can be the collection membership listing. The set of CRLs issued by an 
issuer can also be a collection membership listing. WebDAV is widely supported, 
several open source implementations are available including one for Apache, and 
there is an active community working with it (see http://www.webdav.org/). 
WebDAV resources are named by URLs, where the hierarchical names are 
delimited with the “/” character. The name of a collection ends with /. If we model 
our X.509 certificate store in the same way as an LDAP directory tree, and name it 
using the subject DNs to represent collections, this provides us with the ability to 
retrieve a listing of all the certificates that are owned by a single subject.  For 
example, a public key certificate belonging to the subject whose Distinguished Name 
is c=gb, o=University of Kent, cn=David Chadwick, might be named in a WebDAV 





Note that the last component pkc=Verisign%20Class1.p7c is the unique name (in 
terms of the collection) given to the certificate by its issuer. We do not mandate any 
specific values here, but we recommend using the following file extensions: .p7c for 
public key certificates, .ace for attribute certificates and .crl for CRLs. A GET request 







We can similarly model a CRL store as a collection under its issuer, using the 
collection name cn=CRLs/, and name each CRL that is issued with the serial number 
of the certificate that it revokes. This provides us with the ability to retrieve a listing 
of all the CRLs that have been issued by a single issuer. For example, if David 
Chadwick is an attribute authority who delegates an attribute certificate with serial 
number 1234456 to another person in his organization, and then subsequently revokes 





A GET request to retrieve all the CRLs issued by David Chadwick would use the 






In order to create a new collection, WebDAV specifies the MKCOL method. The 
difference between this method and HTTP PUT or POST, is that the latter are allowed 
to overwrite existing content at the specified URL, whereas MKCOL will fail if there 
is any existing content at the specified URL. In the context of X.509, this ensures that 
a certificate issuer cannot unwittingly overwrite existing certificates when creating a 
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new collection for a subject. This is an important concern when there are several 
certificate issuers for the same subject (either attribute certificate issuers and/or public 
key certificate issuers). It is important to ensure that no issuer deletes the certificates 
issued by another issuer. 
In order to create a certificate or CRL or update an existing certificate in an 
existing collection, the PUT method is used. It is essential that every certificate and 
CRL has a unique name within a collection, so that updates can overwrite the same 
certificate and new certificates and CRLs cannot overwrite existing ones. The onus 
for creating the unique names is with the issuer. We have defined our own algorithms 
for ensuring this uniqueness is maintained in our implementation, see Section 4 
below. 
In order to revoke a certificate, the HTTP DELETE command is used by the issuer. 
This removes the certificate and its properties from the WebDAV server. 
Simultaneously with this, if CRLs are supported, the issuer should use the HTTP PUT 
method to create a new CRL containing the serial number of the certificate that has 
just been revoked. The revocationDate and thisUpdate fields of the CRL should be set 
to the current time, and the nextUpdate field should be set to sometime after the 
certificate was due to expire, thereby ensuring that the CRL never needs to be 
reissued or updated. 
Document properties are specified in XML as name/value pairs. Property names 
must be globally unique and are specified using XML namespaces [11]. Property 
values should be human readable (in any appropriate character set). Properties can be 
flagged as live or dead, where live means that the server validates that the values are 
syntactically correct, and the server may actually set the values of some system 
known properties, whereas dead means that the client is responsible for validating the 
syntax and semantics of the property values. For X.509 use, we initially intended to 
use live properties, set by the certificate issuer, to represent fields of the certificate. 
We anticipated this would allow easy searching of the certificate store to find 
certificates with certain properties, for example, find the AC of David Chadwick that 
has a manager role value. The WebDAV protocol does support the PROPFIND 
method, in which the properties of a resource can be retrieved, but it not possible to 
specify which property value you require. Only the property types can be specified. 
Consequently, if we perform a PROPFIND for the "Role" property, then the web 
server will return an XML encoded message containing all the ACs that contained a 
property named Role along with their values. Clearly this is not a viable solution. 
Work on the WebDAV searching and locating capability (DASL) started in 1998, but 
the work was never completed and the IETF closed the DASL working group some 
years later. The latest version of the WebDAV Searching and Locating protocol is 
very recent [17] and several implementations are said to exist, but we were unable to 
find a usable one. Consequently we have left the search feature for future work. 
Instead we have implemented a browsing capability in our user agents which allows a 
user to tree walk through a certificate store and select the certificate that he is looking 
for. The browse capability is fully scalable, user friendly and meets all the 
requirements of our use cases. See section 4 and figure 3 for more details. 
WebDAV also provides other features that we do not need for X.509 use, such as 
the ability to copy and move web documents between servers, and the ability to write 
lock the certificate store when an issuer is performing updates. Consequently, these 
wont be discussed further. 
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Fig. 2. The PERMIS Authorisation Infrastructure 
4   Using WebDAV in PERMIS 
PERMIS [12, 13] is an application independent privilege management infrastructure 
that comprises credential issuing and credential validation functionality as well as 
policy creation and policy decision making functionality. The components that are 
important to the current discussion are the Attribute Certificate Manager (ACM) and 
Delegation Issuing Service (DIS), which both issue X.509 role ACs to holders, and 
the Credential Validation Service (CVS) which validates the issued role ACs (see 
Figure 2). In addition, the Policy Editor creates XML policies to control the behaviour 
of the DIS, CVS and PDP, and each policy can be embedded as a policy attribute in 
an X.509 AC and digitally signed by its issuer. The policy AC can then be stored in 
the issuer’s collection of ACs, along with his role ACs. Note that the only difference 
between a role AC and a policy AC is the content of the attribute that is embedded in 
the AC (although the holder and issuer of a policy AC always contains the same DN). 
In the original implementation of PERMIS, all the issued X.509 ACs were stored in 
LDAP directories, in the attributeCertificateAttribute of the entries of their holders. A 
major disadvantage of this, is that it is impossible to retrieve a single AC of a holder. 
Instead the entire set of ACs (role and policy ACs) held by a holder has to retrieved as 
a set. The latest implementation now has the ability to store the ACs in and retrieve 
them from WebDAV repositories, in which each AC is uniquely identified. 
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Fig. 3. Retrieving a Policy AC using WebDAV 
4.1   Deriving Unique Names for Certificates and CRLs 
Because policy and role ACs may be updated by their issuers it is important to have 
unique names for each of them. Furthermore, all role ACs must have their unique 
certificate URL and optional revocation URL embedded in extensions so that relying 
parties can retrieve the contents of either URL to check that the role AC has not been 
revoked. Rather than allowing the user to specify the names of the ACs or CRLs, we 
algorithmically create the unique names as follows: 
- each AC has the file suffix .ace, whilst each CRL has the file suffix .crl 
- the name of a role AC file is created from the contents of its first embedded 
attribute value plus the serial number of the certificate E.g. a role AC with the 
embedded attribute type PermisRole with attribute value Project Manager, and 
certificate serial number of 12345 would create the filename 
“PermisRole=Project Manager+SN=123456.ace”. The serial number provides 
the uniqueness, whilst the attribute type and value provides user friendliness 
when the issuer wants to browse WebDAV and retrieve an AC for editing (see 
Figure 3). As an additional user friendly feature, the WebDAV AC browser 
displays the entire contents of all the attributes in the bottom window so that 
the user is sure that he is retrieving the correct role AC. 
- the name of a policy AC file is created from the unique name of the embedded 
XML RBAC policy, which is an XML attribute of the RBAC Policy Element. 
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E.g. a policy with the name “AstroGridUsers” would produce the name 
“Policy=AstroGridUsers.ace” (see Figure 3). As an additional user friendly 
feature, the WebDAV policy browser displays the content of the XML policy 
attribute in either raw XML or natural language (see lower screen) so that the 
user is sure that he is retrieving the correct policy. 
- the name of a CRL file is created from the serial number of the certificate that 
it revokes. E.g. a CRL that revokes a certificate with serial number 1234 
would produce the filename “serialNumber=1234.crl”. 
4.2   Certificate Extensions 
The optional revocation URL can be placed in the existing standard CRL distribution 
points extension. The certificate issuer should place the HTTP URL of the future CRL 
in the uniformResourceIdentifier component of the GeneralName of the 
DistributionPointName. Note that this URL will not exist until the certificate has been 
revoked, therefore it is important that the issuer has a deterministic algorithm for 
creating these URLs, such as the one given in section 4.1 above. 
In order to place the certificate URL in an X.509 extension field, we define a new 
access method for the AuthorityInformationAccess (AIA) extension defined in RFC 
3280 [14].  The AIA extension is designed to point to services of the issuer of the 
certificate in question. One of the standard uses of this extension is to point to  
the OCSP service provided by the issuer. Since our WebDAV service is replacing the 
OCSP service, it seems appropriate to use the AIA extension to point to our WebDAV 
service. We copy below the ASN.1 of the AIA extension, taken from [14] for the 
convenience of the reader: 
 
  AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::= 
           SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription 
 
   AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE { 
           accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
           accessLocation        GeneralName  } 
 
We now define our new accessMethod, webdav, as follows: 
 
webdav OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.10.2 } 
 
When the AIA accessMethod is webdav, then the accessLocation must be a 
URL pointing to the WebDAV server where the certificate can be found. The 
URL must point to the exact location of the certificate in the server so that 
relying parties can download the certificate to compare it to the copy they 
hold. The absence of the certificate at the URL of this WebDAV server 
means that the certificate has been revoked. 
  
The Object Identifier in the definition above is one that we have allocated 
ourselves. However, we propose to take this definition to the IETF PKIX group for 
standardisation, so that the OID can be replaced by one defined by the PKIX group. 
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5   Discussion and Conclusions 
The OASIS SAML specification has the concept of an artifact that can be obtained 
from a remote server using an ArtifactResolve message to request the artifact and an 
ArtifactResponse message to return it [16]. The artifact could be a SAML Attribute 
Assertion, which is similar in concept to an X.509 attribute certificate, except that it is 
designed to be short lived and never revoked. The SAML artifact messages are 
carried over HTTP, therefore will pass transparently through firewalls in the same 
way as our WebDAV protocol. But there the similarity between the two schemes 
ends. There are fundamental conceptual differences between the artifact concept in 
SAML and the certificate publishing and revocation concepts in this paper. Firstly a 
SAML artifact can only be used once. The SAML specification states “The responder 
MUST enforce a one-time-use property on the artifact by ensuring that any 
subsequent request with the same artifact by any requester results in an empty 
response” [16]. Secondly SAML artifacts are meant to be short lived, quote “The 
artifact issuer SHOULD enforce the shortest practical time limit on the usability of an 
artifact, such that an acceptable window of time (but no more) exists for the artifact 
receiver to obtain the artifact and return it in an <ArtifactResolve> message to the 
issuer” [16]. In our design, certificates are assumed to be as long lived as required, 
and used as many times as needed by as many different recipients as the subject 
desires. We thus believe are system is more flexible and requires less processing 
resources on the part of both the issuer and relying party. 
Our scheme has some similarities with the Netscape Navigator certificate 
revocation mechanism [18]. In the Netscape scheme, an X.509 extension netscape-
revocation-url is used to refer to a web location where information about a 
certificate’s status can be found. The actual URL that a relying party should use 
comprises this extension concatenated with the certificate’s serial number (encoded as 
ASCII hexadecimal digits) e.g.  https://www.certs-r-us.com/cgi-bin/check-
rev.cgi?02a56c. The document that is retrieved from this URL contains a single 
ASCII digit, '1' if the certificate is not currently valid, and '0' if it is currently valid. 
The differences with our scheme are immediately obvious. The revocation URL 
document always exists, and its content is not digitally signed by the issuer. In 
comparison our certificate only exists whilst it is has not been revoked and it is a 
standard certificate digitally signed by the issuer. Optionally our CRL only exists if 
the certificate has been revoked, and it is a standard CRL containing a single entry 
signed by the issuer. Our scheme also optionally allows a relying party to find out all 
the certificates that have been revoked by a particular issuer, by retrieving the 
WebDAV CRL collection (cn=CRLs/) under the issuer’s WebDAV entry. 
The one security weakness in our scheme is that it is vulnerable to denial of service 
attacks, in that if the WebDAV server is not available, relying parties will not be able 
to tell if a certificate has been revoked or not. But other schemes such as OCSP 
servers and published CRLs are also equally vulnerable to DOS attacks, and so our 
scheme is no different in this respect. However, published CRLs do have one 
advantage in that an old CRL retrieved sometime in the past might still be available to 
the relying party, and this is better than having no CRL at all, since it does contain 
some revoked certificates. If this is seen to be a significant benefit, then our optional 
CRL publishing mechanism is equivalent to it, in that a CRL collection can be 
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downloaded at any time, just like a conventional CRL. The CRL collection can also 
be replicated and cached to improve availability. Other well known DOS protection 
methods, such as overcapacity and server clustering will have to be employed in order 
to be fully protected against DOS and DDOS attacks, but these are fairly standard 
techniques that are employed by DNS servers and commercial web sites such as 
Amazon. Consequently we do not believe that DOS attacks are any more of a 
significant security threat to our scheme than to existing ones. 
The one performance weakness of our scheme is that the latency of certificate 
validation increases due to network overheads, as compared to that of traditional 
CRLs, but not to that of OCSP servers. This may be a critical factor to some relying 
parties such as central servers which process thousands of certificates per second. 
Central servers benefit from downloading traditional CRLs when they are not busy 
and storing the results in a local cache for fast lookups when they are validating 
certificates. The disadvantage of this approach is that the central server still has a 
vulnerability period between the date and time the latest CRL was published and now, 
during which all recently revoked certificates will not yet have been incorporated into 
the latest CRL. This provides an attack window for the holders of the recently 
revoked certificates. If on the other hand the certificate issuer supports our WebDAV 
certificate publishing scheme alongside its traditional CRL publishing (or our 
WebDAV single CRLs scheme) then the central server may check the current status 
of certificates. It can use the WebDAV GET operation for the certificates of high risk 
or high value transactions, whilst continuing to use its CRL cache for the certificates 
of lower risk transactions. In this way the latency penalty of WebDAV lookups is 
only incurred for a few certificate validations. 
In contrast, low throughput relying parties which only process a certificate every 
few minutes, and where the subject base is very large (and hence so are the traditional 
CRLs) will benefit greatly from our WebDAV approach of contacting the certificate 
URL at the time of each certificate validation. This is not too dissimilar from 
contacting an OCSP server, in terms of processing overheads (HTTPS overheads vs. 
signed OCSP responses) and latency. The advantages of our WebDAV scheme are 
that HTTPS and web servers are more ubiquitous than OCSP servers, and where 
OCSP servers compute their responses on published CRLs and therefore are out of 
date, WebDAV responses are based on the latest up to date certificate status 
information. 
Finally, comparing our single CRL per certificate scheme against traditional CRLs, 
we see that there is a trade off between the currency of the revocation information and 
the overhead of signature creation and validation. A traditional CRL only requires one 
signature creation per revocation period and one signature validation per relying party 
per period, whereas our scheme requires one signature creation per revoked certificate 
and one signature validation per relying party per revocation. The more certificates 
are revoked per revocation period, the more the processing overhead increases, but so 
does the risk. Consequently the increased processing overhead has to offset against 
the risk reduction of instant revocation, but this tradeoff can only be determined on a 
per-application basis. 
To conclude, we have described a new way of publishing and revoking X.509 
certificates based on the ubiquitous WebDAV protocol that has a number of distinct 
advantages over current schemes. We have implemented this in our PERMIS 
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privilege management infrastructure and performed initial user testing. It has recently 
been released as open source software along with the existing PERMIS source code, 
and we will soon expect to obtain operational experiences from users. 
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